FOREWORD

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In October 1904 naval ships of the Imperial Russian Fleet in the Baltic Sea left their home ports on their way to the Far East to participate in a war with the Empire of Japan. Approaching the Dogger Bank area of the North Sea, and allegedly basing their action on ‘intelligence’ reports, the ships opened fire on a harmless collection of British fishing vessels, causing death and destruction.¹

When the news broke in England, the Russian excuse that they had mistaken the fishing boats for torpedo-carrying Japanese warships was dismissed contemptuously. Few believed that anyone claiming to be a mariner could make such a mistake, especially thousands of miles from the warzone and given the huge disparities between the sizes of the ships concerned. In consequence, there was a real risk of war. As a result of French intervention, the parties concerned agreed to convene a commission of inquiry under the Hague Convention of 1899. The commission met in Paris. Its investigations unveiled the nervousness of the Russian sailors and the rumours that unleashed the attack (which

was soon followed by other disasters enroute to the warzone, when real vessels of Japan’s navy trounced the Russians in combat.

The commission of inquiry met and reported promptly. Its findings were prudently written in an understated style. They even included face-saving remarks about the Russian admiral. Russia paid compensation, substantial for the times, to the families of the dead fishermen. A memorial, of which there were shortly to be many more, was erected in Kingston upon Hull. War was avoided. Honour was saved. The Entente between France, Russia and Britain was preserved to await the Great War which lay just around history’s corner.

Ironically, the Great War itself also involved a proposed commission of inquiry. Everyone knows that the war arose following the murder of Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand and his Duchess, following shots fired in Sarajevo in June 1914. The immediate casus belli, however, was the refusal of Serbia (that agreed to many other terms) to bow to Austrian demands about the constitution of a commission of inquiry to investigate the Sarajevo incident.² One commission of inquiry worked perfectly. The other never got off the ground. Unimaginable suffering, reaching right up to the current age, might have been avoided if only time had allowed wiser counsel to prevail in 1914. The mechanism was promising, given the successful recent demonstration. However, the execution was imperfect, overtaken by events and squabbling over the details.

The idea of creating commissions of inquiry to investigate dangerous incidents of international circumstances was in the air much earlier,

indeed at the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). After the prolonged and costly Napoleonic wars, the European powers, “tired out with war”, sought to establish effective institutional means to resolve dangerous conflicts and to restrain wars and the causes of war. The central idea was that the law of nations would provide an effective alternative to unbridled power. In the century of substantial peace that followed Vienna, many international arbitration treaties emerged. Eventually, the *Hague Convention* of 1899 was adopted, designed to promote peaceful solutions to conflicts. The success of the Dogger Bank Inquiry was in the minds of President Woodrow Wilson and other leaders when they gathered at Versailles and Paris following the Armistice of 1918, to create the League of Nations. The *Covenant of the League of Nations* was agreed to. Yet Wilson predicted in 1918 that peace would only be assured if it was built on foundations of law and justice:

“It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.”

The League Council used good offices, mediation, conciliation and commissions of inquiry in various combinations. Occasionally, these mechanisms produced useful results. And yet the League failed and war returned to Europe. When the *Charter* of the United Nations was agreed in 1945, it expressly envisaged the utilisation by the Security Council, in any dispute the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, of a search for a solution by nominated means. The second of these stated means was

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3 Pollack, above n.1,  
4 President Wilson quoted by Pollock, above n.1 at 241.  
“inquiry”. Moreover, the Security Council was expressly authorised to “investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuation of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”. The Council was empowered to decide what measures should be taken, as deemed necessary for the performance of its functions. Clearly these provisions envisaged the establishment and use by the Security Council of commissions of inquiry. So it was no surprise that they were created.

The broad powers of the Secretary-General also envisaged such a facility. Whilst there is no express grant of the power of inquiry to the General Assembly, the ambit of that body’s functions, together with the necessarily implied powers to discharge its responsibilities, extended to the conduct of inquiries. These included by the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations (amongst other things) for “promoting international cooperation… and assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”.

The creation by the General Assembly of the Human Rights Commission, and later the Human Rights Council, also envisaged the establishment of commissions of inquiry when deemed necessary to discharge their respective functions. Given the preceding history in the 19th Century, in the League of Nations and in the necessities presented on the creation of the United Nations in 1945, it would have been

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7 Charter, art. 34.
8 Charter, art. 39.
9 Under the Charter, art. 97 (chief administrative officer of the Organization; “performance of such other functions as are entrusted to him”. See also art. 101.3 “highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity”.
10 Charter art. 13.1(b) see also art.14.
astonishing if the new organisation had not moved quickly to create commissions of inquiry where that mechanism was deemed appropriate and necessary.

However, to the preceding history and the express and implied powers granted by the Charter was added an additional dimension. This was the significant relationship envisaged by the Charter between the several “common ends” recognised in the “Purposes of the United Nations” stated in Article 1. These were, relevantly, to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and to:

“… achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”.

Although human and peoples’ rights preceded the adoption of the United Nations Charter, it was the devastating evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (together with the horrifying dangers of nuclear weapons) that made the potentially dangerous interconnections between such rights and international peace and security much clearer and more urgent. Initially, it was envisaged that the United Nations Charter itself would include human rights provisions. When that proved impossible to achieve, work was continued separately on the

11 Charter, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in December 1948. Having adopted the UDHR, and the treaty law that was to follow, it became inevitable that institutions would be needed to refine the applicable rules, to provide for the receipt of complaints about derogations; to facilitate investigations; to reach and express findings, conclusions and recommendations; to determine and implement responses; to adjudicate at least some of the ensuing accusations; to punish and sanction a number of those responsible; to derive lessons from the entire process; and to record, publicise and educate others on the lessons learned.

Mandate holders were needed to discharge various steps on the pathways to these responses. At the more formal and serious end of the spectrum of mandate holders were those appointed to commissions of inquiry.

During my judicial service in Australia, I was appointed to United Nations mandates involving fact-finding and conciliation\(^1\) and to a mandate under the Human Rights Commission.\(^2\) However, after the conclusion of my judicial service I received, for the first time, a mandate to chair a UN commission of inquiry. I was surprised by the relative lack of materials available to the Commissioners (and for that matter to their independent secretariats) to provide academic and other insights and afford guidance on the discharge of their respective duties.\(^3\) How helpful it would have been, in preparing for our work, to have had the collection of papers now published in this book.


\(^2\) As Special Representative of the Secretary General for Human Rights in Cambodia (1993-96).

\(^3\) Subsequently the OHCHR issued Commission of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions.
Without a book containing the history, analysis, comparisons, commentary, criticism, praise and evaluation like this present one, appointees were largely obliged to rely on in-house opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of earlier COI’s, on passages in their reports where such bodies described their approaches and methodologies; and on a few text books or legal research documents that drew attention to UN resolutions, sometimes with limited specific relevance to their particular assignments, the precise terms of their mandates and the experience of the members.

Necessarily, this meant that each COI was largely dependent on the experience, legal culture and personal backgrounds of the mandate holders and of the secretariat officers who were assigned to work with them. Now there is no excuse for COI members to embark on their important duties without the thorough briefing that this book affords. Every chapter in this book lists questions which mandate holders in future COIs may need to ask themselves and to debate and resolve:

* Are there steps that they should take to ensure greater diversity of participants and viewpoints? (Intro);
* How should they resolve disputed issues of fact when they arise and accord procedural fairness to relevant actors? (Intro);
* Have they adequately explored the history, procedures and outcomes of at least those COIs most similar to their own? (Ch.1);
* Have they familiarised themselves with the UNHCR Code of Practice and ensured that it is observed, where relevant, by all players? (Ch.1);
* Is a recommendation of referral to the ICC or any other court or tribunal competent, appropriate and desirable in the case of their COI? (Ch.1);
* Can accountability for human rights violations be secured without destroying the chances for change in the state of human rights and in safeguarding peace and security? (Ch.1);
* What can/should they do to avoid the perils of geopolitics and to stick to a more useful if subsidiary, role in fulfilling their mandate? (Ch.2);
* How may they inform themselves of non-Western and minority viewpoints, so as to contribute to the legitimacy of their COI, and COIs generally, in the wider world? (Ch.2);
* How can their report reach out beyond the asymmetries and misalignments that sometimes accompany the politics of human rights? (Ch.2);
* Are there any steps that they can take to contribute in practical ways to the de-escalation of tensions – as for example adopting a strictly legal and confined analysis? (Ch.3);
* Do their terms of reference permit only backward looking issues of accountability? Or can they address future looking issues and problem solving? (Ch.3);
* How may one reconcile adherence to the rule of international law with practical contributions to human rights in the present and future? (Ch.3);
* Are COI members themselves the best people to conduct the inquiry? Or should more suitable persons be engaged to support and supplement their investigations? (Ch.4);
* Have the COI members retained an independent voice in the selection and supervision of their secretariat and other contributors? (Ch.4);

* Have they thought through and applied the applicable standard of proof for the resolution of factual conflicts and contested evidence? (Ch.5);

* Are the powers that they enjoy adequate to the discharge of their inquiries? Or should they propose new and different powers and if so what? (Ch.5);

* How do COI members control a natural sympathy for victims but also win respect by true adherence to the rule of law, including where that law is unclear or doubtful? (Ch.6);

* How do COI members constantly impose reality checks on evidence, witnesses and themselves in reaching factual conclusions? (Ch.6);

* Do COI members truly understand the differences between their role in a COI and the respective functions of prosecutors, tribunals and courts? (Ch.6);

* How do COI members protect themselves from stepping beyond fact-finding into an inappropriate and excessive prosecutorial or judgmental posture? (Ch.7);

* How do COIs make wise decisions on the potentially damaging publication of names, before appropriate prosecutorial and judicial decisions have been reached by persons with specific authority to do so? (Ch.7);

* What connection, if any, should COI members have with the ICC, prosecutors, or other courts and tribunals? (Ch.7);
* Does membership of a COI afford those members an appropriate command of the applicable rules of international human rights and humanitarian law? Or do the COI members need to look outwards and further afield? (Ch.8);

* How will COI members be faithful to the limitations, as well as the opportunities of the mandate they have received. How will they put a break on exceeding their jurisdiction, where that is a risk? (Ch.8);

* Whilst discharging their own functions, how will COI members make a beneficial contribution to the credibility and legitimacy of UN COIs generally and the global pursuit of human rights and justice? (Ch.9);

* Do COI members sometimes need, within their mandate, to consider balancing accountability and immunity? Can accountability ever be achieved without some selectivity and occasional provision of immunity? (Ch.9);

* Do COI members have authority, by their mandates or in international law, to push the envelope of expressing culpable wrongdoing? Or should they reject ‘activism’ of that kind as damaging to the credibility of fragile new human rights institutions? (Ch.9);

* What approach should be taken in fact-finding and adjudication to contribute to a coherent development of related areas of international law? (Ch.10);

* How do COIs fulfil the basic obligation first to do no harm? How should they act to balance a policy of transparency against full protection for victims? (Ch.11);
* In one sided inquiries, what can be done to maintain objectivity and to avoid capture by an understandable empathy and symbiosis? (Ch. 11);

* How do the members of a COI ensure full integrity and independence, including in relation to each other? When is dissent in reasoning and outcomes justified or necessary? When will it simply undermine the findings and delay any practical action? (Ch.11);

* What formal procedures should be put in place to reinforce natural justice and high standards of procedural fairness? (Ch.12);

* When is it appropriate to give notice of adverse conclusions to permit those accused a right of response? And when might such procedural niceties simply delay or impede the conduct of efficient investigations?\(^\text{16}\) (Ch.12);

* How will COI members write a report at once accurate but also readable? How will clarity be assured whilst avoiding inappropriate emotion and prejudgment? (Ch.12);

* What are the appropriate delineations between the functions of COIs and the functions of other UN human rights mandate-holders (e.g. special rapporteurs)? Where does the balance lie between thoroughness, fairness and speedy responses to shocking revelations that call out for early responses? (Ch.13);

These, and many more, issues are woven through this book. It affords its readers a thread of Ariadne: to guide the future members of COIs and to provide those working with them a means through the maze as well

\(^{16}\) F. Wilmot-Smith, “Blame Robert Maxwell – On How Public Inquiries Go Wrong” London Review of Books, 17 March 2006, 33. The reference is to the litigations brought by publisher Robert Maxwell in the English Court of Appeal challenging inquiries for failing to give him due notice. See also Air New Zealand Limited v Mahon [19 AC ].
as measures of protection to avoid the ever threatening minotaurs of error, prejudgment, partiality and unprofessionalism.

Several authors in their respective chapters disagree with what others have written. Of course, the starting point in each inquiry must the precise language of the mandate. Even here those appointed to a COI may adopt different approaches because of their individual backgrounds, experience and culture. A former judge from a common law jurisdiction may place a greater store on transparency than an appointee from the civilian inquisitorial tradition. A person whose background has been diplomacy may lay emphasis on resolving underlying tensions. One whose experience has been in criminal law may emphasise accountability and the emphatic exposure of wrongdoing. Thus, many of the innovations in procedures adopted by the COI on DPRK were a reflection on my own professional experience. And yet, they were readily agreed to by the two other members of that COI, each from civilian countries and one with high experience as an advocate in that tradition. Unanimously, we considered that transparency was the antidote to our exclusion from, and non-cooperation by, the country subject to our inquiry.\textsuperscript{17} Our mandate was express and emphatic in relation to accountability. We were not at liberty to ignore it or to turn a blind eye.

In international jurisdiction, as in municipal jurisdiction, inquiries are proliferating and this book turns the spotlight of inquiry upon international

inquiring themselves. If this results in the strengthening of the lawfulness, consistency and professionalism in the conduct of COIs this will itself be an important contribution to the goal of universal human rights expressed in the UN Charter. That goal was spelt out in the eloquent language of Eleanor Roosevelt, René Cassin, John Humphrey and others in the text of the UDHR and in the law that has followed. For the contribution that this book makes to the evolution of global human rights we should be truly grateful.

Silent, voiceless, suffering victims do not need bleeding hearts and emotional demands from COIs. If the global protection of human rights, justice, peace and security are to be attained, the needs are different. They include lawfulness, integrity, experience, professionalism, calm analysis, and contextual appreciation and insight. To the extent that the writers in this book contribute to these goals they contribute to a better, safer and less violent world.