OF ADVOCATES, DRUNKS AND OTHER PLAYERS:
PLAIN TALES FROM AUSTRALIA

The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG*

REMEMBERING PETER TAYLOR

There is no point in holding a memorial lecture in which the honouree is ignored. Dangers lie in that decision. The wrath of the spirits may demand retaliation. Because tomorrow, I fly across half the world, this is not a time for me to take such risks.

Mind you, on the basis of the earthly manifestations, Peter Taylor's spirit would not demand notice, still less praise. He was a decade older than I; but so were most of the leading English judges of the 1980s and 90s, whom I came to know when I was first chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission and President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. His career followed the golden path from grammar school to an exhibition to Pembroke College, Cambridge; a call to the Bar by Inner Temple in 1954; silk in 1967; periods as a Recorder and as Chairman of the Bar in 1979. Judicial appointment in 1980, quickly followed by elevation to the Court of Appeal in 1988; the Hillsborough Football Club

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Enquiry in 1989; and then the pinnacle, as Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales from 1992.

When I met Peter Taylor, in company with other English judges in the 1990s, he seemed classical in his faultless manners; his obvious intelligence; and complete control of the self. If I detected an unusual feature in his personality, it was an element of informality: an impression confirmed by dark rumours that he had engaged as a judge with the mass media, in defending the judiciary and in criticising government ministers for their law and order campaigns and their assault on funding legal aid. He had even (it was whispered) given permission for women barristers to wear trousers in court: an act that caused deep offence to some of the more traditional members of the patriarchy at that time.

What I did not know, in my encounters with Lord Taylor of Gosforth was that he was Jewish; that his father was an immigrant medical practitioner from Central Europe; that he grew up outside the establishment; and above all, that he was a gifted musician, forced to choose between a life as a professional pianist and a life at the Bar. It says more about his colleagues than about him that no-one ever mentioned this heretical obsession. In the law, our love of the profession tends to smother notice of other immaterial talents. I wish I had been present on the occasion when Peter Taylor was advertised to speak at a City dinner and, instead, walked to a grand piano, played two Scarlatti sonatas, bowed and resumed his place without saying a single word. Would that I could delight your spirits by a similar accomplishment. But I cannot.
Peter Taylor’s death in April 1997\(^1\), which followed closely that of his wife Irene in 1995, was a shock to friends of the English law throughout the Commonwealth. He looked so robust. He was so accomplished with so much still to give. The Professional Negligence Bar Association of England and Wales shared in the sense of loss. This lecture series was therefore created to assuage the feelings of colleagues and friends about his untimely passing; and to keep alive his memory amongst those who never had the chance to know him – even as imperfectly as I.

Those who have served in courts throughout the Commonwealth of Nations realise the special debt they owe to the judges of England, past and present. This lecture has been given in the past by leaders of the Bench in Britain. But also by lecturers from Canada (Justice Beverley McLachlin, now Chief Justice); New Zealand (Lord Cooke of Thorndon) and South Africa (Justice Edwin Cameron, now of the Constitutional Court). At last, an Australian is called to deliver. Gladly I do so, regretting only that I speak now from the irrelevant cross-benches of retirement, where my voice is muted and with no present authority unless, with Scarlatti, it can appeal to your sensibilities.

**OF ADVOCATES**

When I retired from judicial office after 34 years, 13 of them as a Justice of the High Court of Australia, I was richly rewarded for my labours by the practising Bar. Here in England, Inner Temple did me the honour of appointing me a Bencher. I was proud to follow Peter Taylor to that office. In Australia, successively, the Australian Bar Association, the Law Council of Australia and the governing body of my home Bar, the

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\(^1\) Details of the life of Peter Taylor are taken from the Obituary “Lord Taylor of Gosforth” written by James Morton, Wednesday 30 April 1997.
New South Wales Bar Association, conferred on me honorary life memberships. I say this not to boast. But to demonstrate the forgiving qualities of barristers for the assaults that judges inflict on them during service in the courts.

In truth, I inherited the post as President in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the busiest full-time appellate court in Australia, from judges of high talent but sharp tongues who made appearing before them an often fearsome and stomach-churning experience. Like Peter Taylor, I came into the inner circle of the Bench and Bar from the outside. I could never take pleasure in the discomfitures of barristers, at least if it might redound to the disadvantage of their clients’ arguments. Yet in my case, there was a still recent reason why the Bar might have held a grudge against me.

Traditionally, a barrister in England and Australia, was immune from a suit in negligence, brought by a client, in respect of the barrister’s professional performance in court. So much had been upheld by the High Court of Australia in 1988 in its decision in *Giannarelli v Wraith*. In 2005, the principle in that case was questioned when a client brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria against both his barrister and solicitor claiming that their conduct had been lacking in the exercise of reasonable skill, care and diligence, so as to render them liable in contract and tort for monetary damages.

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3 (1988) 165 CLR 543.
In the manner of these things, the case, *D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid*\(^4\) began years earlier. It took a very long time to present its important questions of legal authority, principle and policy to the nation’s final court. Ryan D’Orta-Ekenaike was charged in February 1996 with rape. In July of that year, he pleaded guilty. On arraignment, he changed his plea and stood trial in the County Court of Victoria. At that trial, his plea of guilty was led in evidence and the accused was found guilty and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He applied to the Court of Appeal of Victoria for leave to appeal against his conviction. That Court held that the instructions given by the trial judge on the use which the jury could make of the guilty plea were inadequate. The conviction was quashed and a new trial was directed. At the second trial, the judge ruled that the guilty plea at committal was inadmissible in the circumstances. The jury found the accused not guilty and he was discharged.

Mr. D’Orta-Ekenaike then brought civil proceedings in the County Court of Victoria against Victoria Legal Aid (VLA), which had acted as his solicitor, and against the barrister who had appeared for him at the committal and first trial. The pleadings were framed in negligence, it being alleged that both the barrister and the officer of VLA had negligently advised him that he did not have a defence to the charge of rape; that if he pleaded guilty at the committal he would receive a suspended sentence; and that, if he did not plead guilty there, he would be convicted and would receive a custodial sentence. This advice was said to have been given out of court, at a conference in chambers two days before the committal hearing. It was repeated on the day that hearing began, resulting in the guilty plea. Neither the solicitor nor the

\(^4\) [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2006] 1 LRC 168, AusHC.
barrister had warned the accused that, if he pleaded guilty and subsequently reversed that plea, it could be relied on by the prosecutor as an admission of guilt. The client relied on strong evidence that he was exposed to undue pressure and influence designed to induce him to plead guilty.

Based on the legal principle of immunity from liability in respect of the allegations of negligence, the trial judge in the County Court (Judge Wodak) permanently stayed the damages proceedings. He held that both VLA and the barrister were immune from liability. On this occasion, the Court of Appeal of Victoria refused leave to appeal from the trial judge’s decision. An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was referred to be decided, as on the return of an appeal, by the Full Court of that Court. This is where I became acquainted in the travails of Mr. D’Orta-Ekenaike.

The majority of the High Court of Australia (Chief Justice Gleesoon and Justices McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon) rejected the appeal. They held that a legal practitioner, whether acting as an advocate or as a solicitor instructing an advocate, who gave advice leading to a decision at trial that affected the conduct of the trial, could not be sued in negligence on that account. Specifically, the majority affirmed that there were powerful reasons for the Court to refuse to reopen its decision in *Giannarelli*.

A factor relevant to that decision for four of the Justices (Chief Justice Gleesoon and Justices Gummow, Hayne and Heydon in joint reasons) was the fact that the Victorian Parliament had not proceeded to abolish the immunity enjoyed by barristers and solicitors, following the 1988
decision in *Giannarelli*. The same Justices concluded that the advocate’s immunity from suit resulted from the needs of the judiciary to provide finality to contests and to reinforce the central principle of the judicial system that controversies, once resolved, were not to be re-opened by collateral attack, except in a very few, narrowly defined, circumstances.

The same members of the Court concluded that there were analogous instances where a wrong might occur but without a remedy, including, for example, the immunity from suit enjoyed by judges in respect of their performance of curial functions. They held that to permit negligence suits would be to allow a second court to impugn the final decision of an earlier court, or to permit the re-litigation of matters earlier finally determined. The also rejected an argument that a provision of the *Legal Profession Practice Act* 1958 (Vic) that stated that:

> “Every barrister shall be liable for negligence as a barrister to the client on whose behalf he has been employed to the same extent as a solicitor was on [a date in 1881]”

cured any defects of the common law and indicated a legislative intention to establish actionable liability in barristers.

I alone dissented from all of these holdings. The result was a triumph for the principle of the immunity of the Bar, indeed, an extension of that immunity so that it would apply to solicitors as well. And it applied to conduct out of court, as well as to conduct under the special pressures of in-court advocacy. Champagne corks were heard popping in Phillip Street, Sydney and William Street, Melbourne on the news of the High Court’s orders of March 2005.
In the argument of the *D’Orta-Ekenaike* case, the High Court of Australia had before it the then recent decision of the House of Lords in *Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v Simmons*\(^5\). In that appeal, the Lords identified a number of developments in legal practice which, they concluded, justified a reconsideration, and ultimately abolition, of the immunity for advocates from suit. The issues in the Australian case were broader and more complicated, because of the involvement of the solicitor at the VLA, a statutory authority, and because of the history of 19\(^{th}\) century attempts in Victoria to amalgamate barristers and solicitors and to provide for equal liability in negligence. Still, there were common issues in the two proceedings.

The House of Lords was never formally part of the Australian judicature. Thus, its decision in *Arthur J.S. Hall* did not bind the Australian courts. Nevertheless, great respect is shown throughout the Commonwealth to decisions of final national courts. A recent decision on similar point in England was thus the stimulus for undertaking the review of the Australian ruling in *Giannarelli*. It was the source of the major arguments of legal policy advanced by the appellant in the Australian case. In particular, he latched on to the conclusion stated by Lord Steyn in *Arthur J.S. Hall*\(^6\):

> “[O]n the information now available and developments since *Rondel v Worsley*\(^7\), I am satisfied that in today’s world that decision no longer correctly reflects public policy.”

Whilst sweeping away the old immunity, as a relic of an exclusion from the rules applying to virtually all other professionals, some of the Law Lords in their speeches drew a distinction between collateral attacks on

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\(^5\) [2002] 1 AC 615.
\(^6\) [2002] 1 AC 615 at 683.
\(^7\) [1969] 1 AC 191.
final judgments in civil and in criminal cases. Unanimously, the High Court of Australia was unconvinced that such a differentiation was conceptually viable.

In my reasons, I was required to deal with the peculiar history of the common law rule in Victoria and the foregoing statutory provision, as well a dark hint in argument that the Law Lords in Arthur J.S. Hall had been forced to come to their conclusions because of the superimposition upon their otherwise admirable reasoning of alien concepts contained in the European Convention of Human Rights. In fact, no mention at all had been made of that instrument, a gap that I attributed to the non-application of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) at the time relevant to the proceedings in the Arthur J.S. Hall case. Yet most of my reasons were addressed to the so-called public policy arguments deployed by the majority in the Australian decision to claim the continuance, indeed expansion, of the immunity in Australia.

Amongst other considerations, I referred to the expansion of the number of lawyers engaged in advocacy today, many of whom are not barristers. And the difficulty of providing the immunity for supposed reasons of instantaneous judgement within court rooms, yet denying it to the decisions expected of a surgeon or of a pilot of a large passenger aircraft. The fact that the Court, far from cutting back on the exceptional immunity, was pushing it into new and unhistorical applications, merely demonstrated for me the lack of persuasive reasons behind the Court’s proposed ruling. I am not, of course, questioning that

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8 [2002] 1 AC 615 at 622-625 per Lord Hope of Craighead; at 751-752 per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough.
9 (2005) 223 CLR 1 at 99 [315].
10 223 CLR 1 at 101 [322].
ruling as it states the law of Australia. I am explaining why I could not join in it.

An undercurrent in the majority approach was a fear of floods of litigation, brought by discontented litigants against lawyers, which could not easily be repelled. However, I sought to calm that fear:

“It does not happen in the United States, a most litigious country, where there has never been an immunity from suit for attorney advocates. It does not happen in Canada, where the courts have rejected such a general immunity. Instead, in that country, the courts have concentrated on developing special rules to recognise the practical problem that lawyers often face in conducting trials and giving legal advice. The general unavailability of legal aid in Australia to support negligence claims against lawyers; the availability of summary relief against vexatious claims; and the rules against abuse of process by re-litigation (not to mention the empathy and understanding of judges for co-professionals in unmeritorious cases) make it completely unnecessary to retain an absolute immunity of the broad, even growing, ambit propounded in this case.”

In these remarks, I invoked the comment of Lord Hoffmann in Arthur J.S. Hall:

“[The immunity] is burning down the house to roast the pig; using a broad-spectrum remedy where a more specific remedy without side effects can handle the problem equally well.”

To demonstrate the truth of Lord Hoffmann’s dictum, I was able to invoke the experience of litigation between the time that the trial judge

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11 223 CLR 1 at 103 [328].
16 [2002] 1 AC 615 at 703.
found the immunity unavailable to barristers in Victoria in *Giannarelli*, before that immunity was restored on appeal. There was no objective evidence of any increase in the length of criminal trials in that interval.\(^{17}\) Similarly, in respect of the experience of England, I had available to me an examination of what had happened following the *Arthur J.S. Hall* decision.\(^{18}\) Only a handful of cases involving alleged negligence on the part of barristers had reportedly reached the courts. In only two of them was the barrister found liable at law. This led the commentator to conclude that the *Arthur J.S. Hall* decision:\(^{19}\):

“... does not appear to have caused any great problems for the legal profession. Indeed, the reaction of some in the profession is that it is to be welcomed, if it helps to restore public confidence in the openness and accountability of the profession.”

To the argument of Justice McHugh that the imposition of civil liability upon barristers would be “intolerable”, I suggested that this could not be a governing criterion, and was not so in the case of neurosurgeons or others who make extremely difficult decisions but were responsible for fleeting acts and omissions of carelessness.\(^{20}\) To the appeal to the “undeniable public interest in the maintenance of the independent Bar”\(^ {21}\), I pointed out that such a Bar existed, and would continue to exist. To suggest that in Australia, uniquely, the Bar would be destroyed by removing an anomalous out of court immunity for lawyers portrayed a lack of proper confidence in the survival capacity of the highly talented advocates found in the Australian courts. Australian barristers, and their instructing solicitors, I urged were “made of sterner stuff”.\(^ {22}\)

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\(^{19}\) Ibid, at 662, fn.130.

\(^{20}\) (2005) 233 CLR 1 at 106 [336].

\(^{21}\) (2005) 223 CLR 1 at 39-40 [105]-[108].

\(^{22}\) (2005) 233 CLR 1 at 106 [338].
To the suggestion that the reforms should be left to parliament, I invoked Lord Steyn’s conclusion that judges had created the immunity and judges should say that the grounds for maintaining it no longer existed23. The final reason for rejecting an enlargement of the immunity was that it involved according an anomalous, unjust and unclear exemption from legal liability to a particular class of citizens. In a contemporary and egalitarian society, if that were to be done, it had to be done with the authority of parliament. An extension of liability by judges was unacceptable.

Whilst my reasons stood alone and unloved in the Australian courts, it was a small consolation to me to observe that soon after the Australian decision, the New Zealand courts24, in a similar challenge, preferred my approach to that of the majority. The writing is on the wall for such immunities. It is far from impossible to imagine that even the immunity of judges for instances of deliberate abuse of office or grossly negligent decisions may need to be re-visited: not necessarily to burden judges individually for the recompense required to those who have suffered thereby, but to provide remedies outside decisions that are made bona fide, in the discharge of the judicial office25.

**OF DRUNKS**

If judges, barristers and solicitors are, on the whole, pillars of society and generally admired, or at least respected, for their learning, honesty and diligence in often stressful situations, the same empathy is not usually

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exhibited towards people who get intoxicated, and whilst intoxicated, suffer serious harm, even death.

This is particularly so in the case of injecting drug users, as witness the great difficulty experienced in societies in persuading law makers to introduce schemes of sterile needle exchange, so as to reduce the spread of HIV and AIDS. Despite the overwhelming evidence that such schemes radically reduce the levels of the virus in this cohort of the population, that reflects its general composition, getting sensible policies and reflecting those policies in law, is extremely difficult\(^{26}\).

Even with intoxication caused by alcohol, a drug that is freely available (at least to adults), generally socially accepted and heavily advertised, an antipathy creeps into legal decisions, and tort and statute law, so as to deny the intoxicated rights of recovery where their condition is, in part at least, the result of conduct on the part of alcohol providers. This fact was demonstrated in 2004 in a decision of the High Court of Australia on negligence liability, reached shortly before my retirement from the Court. The case was *Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd*\(^{27}\).

On this occasion, the majority of the Court (Chief Justice Gleesons and Justices Gummow, Hayne and Callinan) concluded that, if the alcohol provider owed a duty of care, it had been discharged by what its employees had done. Two Justices (Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan) held that the provider did *not* owe a general duty to take

\(^{26}\) Established by the United Nations Development Programme Global Commission on HIV and the Law, of which the author is a Commissioner. The rates of HIV infection in injecting drug populations in New Zealand is 1% and in Australia 2% (where such exchange systems operate). It is 18% in Quebec and more than 30% in the United States (where such exchanges do not exist or are difficult to access).

reasonable care to protect patrons against the risk of physical injury from consuming alcohol. Justice McHugh and I dissented. We concluded that there was a duty of care in the circumstances; that it had been breached; and that the breach caused the injury suffered by the plaintiff.

As is usual in cases of negligence litigation, whether involving professional negligence or otherwise, a detailed appreciation of the facts is essential to distinguish between those cases where a plaintiff succeeds and those where she fails.

Tweed Heads is a pleasant seaside holiday resort town in New South Wales, just south of the Queensland border. On a Sunday, in June 1994, its rugby league football club offered a champagne (actually Spumante) breakfast free-of-charge to all comers. Mrs. Cole proceeded to drink large quantities of the available sparkling wine. Like other patrons, she moved between the drinking area and a vantage point where she could watch football games on the adjacent field. Drinking continued well into the afternoon. Although by 12.30pm, Mrs. Cole was clearly intoxicated, she was still sold a bottle of wine, although variously described as “very joyous and happy” or “an embarrassment, totally inebriated”\(^28\). By 3.00pm, the wife of the manager of the club refused to sell her more alcohol because of her state. Still, she remained on the premises, and in the company of friends who, inferentially, were providing more alcohol to her.

At about 5.30pm in the afternoon, the club manager asked her to leave on account of her drunken and indecent behaviour. He offered her use of the club’s courtesy bus or to call a taxi to take her home. She

\(^28\) (2004) 217 CLR 469 at 474 [6].
rejected these offers. Soon after, she left the club on foot in the company of two men, with one of whom the indecent public behaviour had occurred. At 6.20pm, Mrs. Cole suffered very serious injuries when she was run down by a motor vehicle on a public road near the club. She sued the driver of the vehicle and the club, claiming negligence.

At trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the trial judge found against both defendants but concluded that there was contributory negligence on Mrs. Cole’s part. He apportioned liability: 30% to each of the defendants and 40% to Mrs Cole. The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld appeals, set aside the judgment and dismissed Mr. Cole’s action. Special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was granted by Chief Justice Gleeson and me. However, the High Court, by majority, rejected the appeal.

Once again, the case was a little complicated by the intervention of statutory law. By the Registered Clubs Act 1976 (NSW), s44A, it is an offence for a registered club, like that at Tweed Heads, to supply liquor to an intoxicated person. It was not argued that this criminal provision, of itself, gave rise to a civil cause of action. But it was contended that the common law duty in negligence would mould itself to the stated parliamentary obligation. This view was rejected by a majority of the High Court in what I described as a “withered view of community and legal neighbourhood propounded by” them.

In my opinion, the statutory provisions “shed light on the problems presented because they make plain the purpose of parliament that

29 Cole v Lawrence (2001) 33 MVR 159.
30 (2004) 217 CLR 469 at 496 [93].
intoxicated persons are not to be sold, or supplied with, alcohol on ... club premises\textsuperscript{31}. Yet his had happened at 12.30pm when the evidence showed that Mrs. Cole was already seriously affected by the free alcohol earlier supplied to her. The object of the common and statutory law was to prevent things coming to the inebriated circumstances that could lead to tragic outcomes, as they did to Mrs. Cole by 6.00pm.

The majority of the Australian Court was obviously concerned to avoid imposing nanny-like duties on an alcohol outlet that would substitute for the freewill of the patrons, like Mrs. Cole. This was an understandable concern. But expert evidence, supported by commonsense and ordinary experience, showed the need for some firmness of action at an early, rather than later, stage in the deterioration of Mrs. Cole’s inhibitions and self-control. One can understand the conclusions reached by the majority. But it was my view that a higher standard should be imposed for all the Mrs. Coles of this world, given the role that a national final court plays in expressing the legal requirements of neighbourliness\textsuperscript{32}:

“The law of tort exists not only to provide remedies for injured persons where that is fair and reasonable and consonant with legal principle. It also exists to set standards in society, to regulate wholly self-interested conduct and, so far as the law of negligence is concerned, to require the individual to act carefully in relation to a person who is in law a neighbour\textsuperscript{33}. The club had a commercial interest to supply alcohol to its members and their guests, including [Mrs. Cole]. Doing so tended to attract them to an early-morning breakfast, to induce them to use profitable gambling facilities in the club’s premises and to encourage them to use the restaurant and other outlets where alcohol would continue to be purchased or supplied to the profit of the club ... [T]he common law has long recognised that the occupier of premises owes a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of those who enter the

\textsuperscript{31} (2004) 217 CLR 469 at 496 [94].
\textsuperscript{32} (2004) 217 CLR 469 at 494-5 [91].
\textsuperscript{33} Donohue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580.
premises. That duty arises from the occupation of premises. It extends to protection from injury from all of the activities of the premises, including, in registered premises such as the club’s, the sale of alcoholic drinks.”

Justice McHugh reached a similar conclusion. Still, our opinions did not carry the day. Our references to standards that had been applied in earlier decisions in analogous cases in Australia and overseas were to no avail. Justice McHugh concluded his opinion:

“No doubt some minds may instinctively recoil at the idea that the Club should be liable for injuries sustained by a drunken patron who is run down after leaving its premises. But once it is seen that the Club has a legal duty to prevent her drinking herself into a state where she was liable to suffer injury, the case wears a different complexion. The Club has a legal responsibility for the injury. Instinct must give way to the logic of the common law.”

The factors that weighed on my mind were similar. According to the majority’s analysis, there was no sanction upon the provider of alcohol to prevent or discourage it from plying a patron with alcohol (including free Spumante over several hours) and then taking only formal steps to secure her return to her residence of safety. There was no reinforcement of the parliamentary will to prohibit the licensee supplying further alcohol to the intoxicated. Nothing was effectively done to diminish conduct that would reduce a decent citizen to public acts of indecency and personal gross inebriation. Truly, the law washed its hands of responsibility. Judges in a final court, at least, must consider whether this is the standard of the law for the society they live in.

A second case arose after my retirement from judicial office where the decision in Cole was applied in equally troubling circumstances: CAL

No.14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board\textsuperscript{35}. In that case, a widow instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. She claimed damages as a result of the death of her husband, consequent upon injuries sustained by him when his motor cycle collided with a bridge whilst he was driving home. The claim alleged negligence on the part of the proprietor and licensee of a hotel in Triabunna, a township in beautiful Tasmania. The evidence at trial showed that the deceased arrived at the hotel at 5.00pm. He began drinking beer and then spirits. When a rumour circulated that a police breathalyser and speed camera had been set up nearby, it was suggested to him (and he agreed) that he would put the motor cycle in a locked store and collect it the next day. The licensee did this and placed the keys to the motor cycle in the petty cash tin, out of reach of the deceased. This was the normal receptacle for keys handed over by customers.

The deceased then stayed on the premises for an additional hour drinking and gambling. He left the premises between 7.45pm and 8.15pm. However, he soon returned demanding access to the motor cycle. The licensee offered to telephone his wife; but was rebuked: “If I want you to ring my fuckin’ wife, I’d fuckin’ ask you”. The licensee alleged that he had asked the deceased three times whether he was fit to drive. Being assured that he was, he provided the keys to the plant room and unlocked it. The fatal accident took place at around 8.30pm.

The trial judge (Justice Blow) rejected the claim of negligence. However, this decision was reversed by a majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania\textsuperscript{36}. By special leave, an appeal was


\textsuperscript{36} Scott v CAL No.14 Pty Ltd [No.2] (2009) 17 TasR 331.
brought to the High Court of Australia. That Court unanimously set aside the orders on appeal. It restored the order of the trial judge, dismissing the action. Specifically, the High Court concluded that the licensee did not owe any duties to the deceased to telephone his wife, in the circumstances disclosed, so that she could come and collect him. Alternatively, the majority of the judges concluded that if there were any such duty to telephone the deceased's wife, the evidence did not support a conclusion that the accident would have been prevented by the hotelier having done so.

To some extent, the case in Tasmania was weaker than Mrs. Cole's case. The period of drinking and the degree of intoxication appears, on the evidence, to have been less prolonged and extreme. On the other hand, the significant (and certainly unusual) step by which the deceased had surrendered the keys of his motor cycle and consented to it being locked away, at least arguably, strengthened the claim of the widow. Why would this course have been suggested, still more why would it have been agreed to, if there was not a significant problem of intoxication recognised and accepted by supplier and patron alike?

Having suggested, and agreed to, such precautions, was it a proper discharge of the duty of care to the deceased to hand over the keys and unlock the store simply because the patron demanded this course with a few ripe expletives? Was not the very act of self-deprivation in the control of the motor cycle enough to alert the licensee to the particular risk that the alcohol it was supplying can sometimes bring? This includes a diminution of the subject’s self-perception and capacity of self-control by reason of the very product which the alcohol provider has a profit motive to keep supplying to the patron?
Arguable, against that potential conflict of interest and duty, the communal sense of neighbourliness, reflected in the law of negligence, requires intervention by courts to set a social standard that alcohol providers will comply with (and can themselves blame and plead in excuse) before letting loose an intoxicated patron on the public roads. Clearly, doing this involves a danger to the patron. But also to others and to the community generally. Here, it involved a distinct danger to the patron’s family who suffered the loss of a breadwinner in consequence of the turning over the keys and unlocking the store, contrary to the very precaution that the patron and licensee had earlier agreed to.

These comments do not, of course, alter the current state of the law in Australia. That law is as stated in Cole and in CAL No.14. But in today’s world, we do not live only in our own jurisdictions. Through the internet, CommLII, AustLII, BailII and that marvellous series The Law Reports of the Commonwealth\(^\text{37}\), all judges, and especially judges of final national courts, have daily access to contemporaneous decisions on analogous problems decided in other English-speaking Commonwealth countries.

In Canada, in 1974, in Jordan House Limited v Menow\(^\text{38}\), a patron was ejected from a hotel where he had been served with beer from the late afternoon and evening until 10.00pm. When he was then struck by a vehicle whilst walking home and sustained serious injuries, he sued and recovered damages at trial, affirmed on appeal. Such damages were

\(^{38}\) [1974] SCR 239 (SCC).
apportioned equally as between the plaintiff, the motor vehicle driver and the hotel. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected a further appeal. The Justices concluded that a duty of care existed in the circumstances; and that it was enlivened, on the evidence, by the manifest intoxication of the plaintiff.

A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1995 in *Stewart v Pettie*[^39]. That was a case where a passenger was seriously injured when a car, driven by her brother, crashed after the brother had been continuously served alcohol by the outlet where he had been drinking throughout the evening. The Supreme Court concluded that a duty of care existed between alcohol-serving establishments and their patrons because the latter were sometimes rendered unable to look after themselves once they become intoxicated. The provider owed a duty not only to the patron but also to third parties who may be dependent on his skill as a driver. Commercial vendors of alcohol were held “unquestionably” to owe a general duty of care to persons who could be expected to use the highways. Injury to a passenger of the patron was therefore foreseeable.

The Canadian court explained that the reluctance of courts to impose affirmative duties on persons for a failure to take positive action had been tempered where a “special relationship” existed between the parties that resulted in the imposition of a positive duty. The Court reached the policy conclusion that such a “special relationship” existed at the least between the vendors of alcohol and the motoring public. That duty was enlivened in the given case because nothing had been done to prevent or inhibit the driver. He was simply let loose to drive his

vehicle, to the danger of his passengers, including his sister, and other members of the public. Against this danger, a higher standard of the common law of negligence applied.

A review of the cases in England\textsuperscript{40} and Australia\textsuperscript{41}, before the decisions in \textit{Cole} and \textit{CAL No.14} shows a large preponderance of decisions upholding claims of negligence against alcohol outlets that continued to provide their product to patrons, to the point of intoxication and beyond, where they are known to be exposed to risks on the public highway. However, in Australia, following the two recent decisions of the High Court, such authorities have been rendered dubious and certainly very risky. In the Great South Land, it seems, drinking alcohol is to be left to private assessment and responsibility despite that product’s inhibiting features. No encouragement is to be given by the common law of negligence to self-control on the part of the outlet or customer control by its employees. Freewill reigns.

Is this a desirable result from a social point of view? A question that inevitably final courts must ask themselves. Perhaps it is my early years attending Methodist churches in Sydney, and there imbibing the culture of community responsibility for its vulnerable members that made me approach such matters with a heightened sense of the law’s duty to uphold community standards and neighbourly duties.

A barrister or solicitor who can never be sued for conduct associated with advice to a client can substantially banish from his or her thinking

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Munro v Porthkerry Park Holiday Estates} [1984] TLR 138.

the sanction of an unpleasant action even for egregious wrongs or the need to explain his conduct in an open court as well as to a public liability insurer. An alcohol outlet that is permitted, without legal sanction, to ply a vulnerable middle-aged woman with alcohol over six hours, or a motor cycle driver recognised to need protection, over three hours, is removed from the irksome stimulus that civil liability can sometimes exert. Representatives of alcohol outlets then have little or no encouragement to introduce rules of good practice controlling the amount of alcohol they serve to patrons over time; and the precautions (including perhaps notification to police) that they should observe, even where doing this might damage their commercial interests which are to turn a blind eye and to wash their hands of ‘other peoples’ problems’.

**OTHER PLAYERS**

The great difficulty with the marvellously incisive speech of Lord Atkin in *Donohue v Stevenson*[^42^] was that it attempted to offer broad principles to guide negligence liability in a vast range of factual circumstances, in the place of the earlier categorisation of causes of action by reference to factual peculiarities. Every judge and every law student knows the famous passage I refer to. It may be Delphic and even circular, as its critics suggest. But it is questing after a broad principle based, ultimately, on notions of community ethics[^43^]:

“[I]n English law there must be and is some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it as such or treat it as in other systems as a species of “culpa”, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person

injured by them to demand relief. In this way, rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law: You must not injure your neighbour, and the lawyer’s questions: Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have had them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”

At the very end of his speech, Lord Atkin said, in words that are rarely quoted:\[1932\] AC 562 at 586.

“[This] is a proposition that I venture to say no-one in Scotland or England who is not a lawyer would for one moment doubt. It will be an advantage to make it clear that the law in this matter, as in most others, is in accordance with sound commonsense.”

So if the facts are overwhelmingly influential in the outcome of cases of negligence at common law, and if the scope of liability depends on a kind of moral equation, the obvious need in society is to cut the Gordian knot that is presented by Lord Atkin’s notion of close and direct affectation that reasonably engages the mind of those whose acts and omissions can cause harm to others, because they are closely and directly affected by the decisions that need to be made.

In Australia, for some time, a test of “legal proximity” was adopted to control the finding of whether a duty of care in law should be upheld or denied:\[155\] CLR 549. By the time I was appointed to the High Court of Australia, this theory of “proximity”, although still “in use”, was undergoing critical reappraisal, in England, Australia and elsewhere. In England, Lord

\[44\]
[1932] AC 562 at 586.

\[45\]
See e.g. Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549.
Oliver had thrown cold water on the notion in *Caparo PLC v Dickman*\(^\text{46}\). In Australia, this eventually encouraged its abandonment in *Sullivan v Moody*\(^\text{47}\). This was because a majority had, by that stage, been assembled which considered that “proximity” was too open-ended; that the imperial march of negligence had to be reversed; that costs of insurance were becoming excessive; and that plaintiffs’ claims needed to be contained and rejected.

In a series of decisions in the High Court of Australia\(^\text{48}\), seeing the writing on the wall of these developments, I urged that the way to tame the tort of negligence – and to control its suggested excesses - was to adopt the three-stage test for finding a duty of care expressed by Lord Bridge of Harwich in *Caparo*\(^\text{49}\). This, in turn, was somewhat similar to an incremental approach earlier suggested by Justice Brennan in the High Court of Australia. It requires examination of (1) whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the alleged *tortfeasor* that the particular conduct or omission would be likely to cause harm to a person such as the claimant; (2) whether between that *tortfeasor* and the claimant, a relationship existed that would be characterised as one of proximity or neighbourhood; and (3) if so, whether it was fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope upon that *tortfeasor* for the benefit of that person\(^\text{50}\)?

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\(^{49}\) [1990] AC 605 at 617-618.

\(^{50}\) Citing Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 623 [232].
At the least, I hoped that this approach would provide a control over idiosyncratic narrowing of liability in negligence and oblige judges (especially in the final court) to address candidly the issues of public policy enlivened by the third question. Thus, in the cases I have examined, the public policy of imposing (or exempting from) liability for the provision of legal advice by advocates (alone of all professionals). And the public policy of effectively exempting alcohol providers from accepting and safeguarding patrons (some of whom will be extremely vulnerable) from the very consequences that the provision of alcohol for profit will occasionally cause.

My quest ultimately came to nothing. It was finally rejected in Australia in *Sullivan v Moody*\(^5^1\). As more and more plaintiffs failed in proceedings in the High Court of Australia, I called attention to the pulling up of the drawbridge from the tradition of community responsibility and neighbourliness. And the substitution of a “shift of legal policy, albeit one that is not usually spelt out by judges as *Caparo* would require”.

In the place of “proximity”, or the *Caparo* enquiry into fairness, justice and reasonableness, the Australian law appears to have embraced a broad touchstone of “reasonableness” in determining when a duty of care will be imposed\(^5^2\). In my last years in the High Court, I accepted the duty “for the time being” to conform to the majority opinion\(^5^3\). However, I confessed that I did so with without enthusiasm or the conviction that a generalised search amongst the “salient features” of the facts of each case was a sensible substitute for a more principled and conceptual approach to charting the miles and bounds of negligence liability.

\(^5^1\) (2001) 207 CLR 562 at 579 [49]-[53].
\(^5^3\) *Graham Barclay Oysters* (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 626 [238].
In coming to this conclusion, I was influenced not so much by the Methodists of my youth as by my service in my middle years in institutional law reform. There, as Lord Scarman had taught, the role of lawyers was, at least partly, to forsake the pragmatic problem-solving, minimalist approaches of the common law – stumbling from one decision to the next. Instead, it was to try to perceive each little problem in the context of the broad canvas of the law. And always to ask how the answer to the particular case would advance desirable outcomes, not only for the parties, but for the community who must live with the judicial resolution of the parties' litigious conflict.

All of which is to say little more than what that earlier judicial conceptualist, Lord Atkin, had remarked in *Donohue v Stevenson*. That particular case must always be seen in our law as instances of a broader genus. That judges of final courts have an extra duty to search for, and express, the broader principles that should guide later and lower courts and ordinary citizens, as surely as statutes do. And that, in the end, they should test their conclusions by the intuitive responses about the content of law that would be held by non-lawyer citizens applying sound commonsense to legal outcomes.\(^{54}\)

If this approach is followed in the two instances I have studied by reference to plain tales from Australia, I do not myself doubt the outcome that should be adopted. Exceptional immunities from liability in negligence would be denied to, still less expanded for, lawyer advocates and their solicitors. And effective immunity would equally be denied to

\(^{54}\) See *Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree* (2005) 224 CLR 627 at 648 [64].
alcohol outlets sheltering behind notions of freewill as they sold their product that has the inevitable effect of diminishing that virtue in the consumers. The outcomes of each case would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances accepted at trial. But the removal of accountability in negligence is intuitively wrong. It is contrary to the neighbour principle as Lord Atkin expounded it.

To the extent that the law concludes otherwise, it needs re-examination. And in the cyclical way of these things, such re-examination will one day come. Lord Taylor's life journeyed marvellously on the cycle. Too soon, he died. But those who are still on the journey have the ongoing responsibility to search for principle and justice; and to make sure, if possible, that they coincide.

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