A Defence of the Constitutional Monarchy
A CELEBRATION OF DEMOCRACY

The Australian Constitution is one of the six oldest constitutions continuously operating in the world. Those who feel that this is a matter for proper pride and who consider that we should stick with the Commonwealth which the Constitution establishes should not feel afraid to express their views. What a sad day it will be for us if diversity of opinion is discouraged and fear replaces reason.

I support reform of society and its laws. But reform means more than change. It means change for the better. My proposition is that it has not been shown that the establishment of a "Federal Republic of Australia" would be a change for the better. We should not forget that, for the whole modern history of Australia, we have been a monarchy. This indisputable historical fact of our sovereignty is part of what it is to be an Australian. For more than 200 years Australians have had a King or Queen. It has become, and is, part of our society's very nature.

I acknowledge that the debate about our Australian polity is a legitimate one. We may have it, unimpeded by guns or the opprobrium of official orthodoxy, precisely because of our constitutional history, conventions and instrument. I can, of course, understand.
some of the criticisms of our constitutional monarchy. For example, I acknowledge that in some parts of Asia the concept of Queen Elizabeth II, as Queen of Australia, may be difficult for some to grasp. Yet I have no doubt that there are niceties of the constitutions of the monarchies of Japan, Thailand and Malaysia — not to say of the republics of the region — that we do not fully understand. No self-respecting country should abandon its history and institutions out of deference for the misunderstandings of its neighbours. No country should alter its constitutional arrangements, if they work well, simply because neighbouring countries do not fully appreciate its history or understand its independence. Regional comity has not, nor should, come to this.

I can appreciate that there are difficulties, even in some Australian minds, in seeing Queen Elizabeth II as the Queen of this country. But that, undoubtedly, by law she is. I admit that there has been a failure to educate our young people concerning our Constitution. It is a failure which I deplore. It should be rectified. But change this as we may it must be accepted that, generally in the world, the Queen is seen as the Queen of the United Kingdom. Indeed, it is by that sovereignty that she becomes the Queen of this country, under our Constitution, made by us. This was something which the Australian people themselves accepted by referenda at Federation. They did so despite arguments advanced most powerfully then in favour of a republic. Of course, when the Queen goes to Europe or to the United States, she will normally be seen as Queen of the United Kingdom. But when she is in Australia, she is undoubtedly our Head of State just as in Canada, she is their Head of State — or in New Zealand so. At other times in Australia, her functions are carried on, on her behalf, and in her name, by an otherwise completely independent Governor-General appointed under our
Constitution and, in the States, by State Governors. For a long time, Governors-General and Governors in Australia have been Australians. The true measure of the independence of the office was fully seen in 1975. The Queen herself declined to intervene in our Australian constitutional crisis. It arose, and had to be solved, exclusively within Australia. That was as the Constitution required and as befits an independent country. The Queen respected this. Yet these matters being said, I accept that there are sincere advocates of various forms of republican government. Intelligent citizens will listen carefully to their arguments. They will remember that no system of government is perfect or unchangeable. In Australia, we should certainly continue our search for the least imperfect form of government. There are various models. But we should not dismiss constitutional monarchy, as it works in our independent country, simply because it is seen as unfashionable by some or because the popular media are going through a phase of disaffection with some members of the Royal Family who, earlier, they covered with fawning attention.

Those who would change the Australian Constitution must, if they are sensitive to their fellow citizens, reflect upon the feelings of those who would keep certain fundamentals unchanged. And they must reckon with the strength of those feelings. To be indifferent to such feelings - in an intolerant pursuit of one's own conception of society - runs the risk of the worst kind of majoritarianism. Paradoxically, democracy works best when it respects the opinion of diverse groups in all parts of the population not just the majority.

I am willing to concede that in the long run some changes to our constitutional monarchy may occur in Australia. The moves from colonies to dominion and from Commonwealth to a fully independent
country continue apace. Our country, like every nation, is on a journey. If Europe is any guide, the journey will probably take us to an enhancement of regional relationships rather than a retreat into the isolation of the nation state. And our region, in the coming century of the Pacific, offers us the opportunities of a special relationship with our neighbours if we can harmonize our national role with our geography.

In our relationship with our sovereigns, Australians have been fortunate for most of the modern history of Australia in the high sense of service and duty which those Sovereigns have displayed. I concede at once that the recent controversies about some members of the Royal Family - and particularly Prince Charles as heir to our Sovereignty - have damaged in some peoples' minds the cause of constitutional monarchy. In the modern age, it seems, it is necessary for the monarch to be admired at all times. I think all would concede this virtue to Queen Elizabeth II. Some people - based upon taped eavesdropping of private conversations and snooping photographers - have formed a different view about the Prince and Princess of Wales and other members of the Royal Family. I pass over how such intrusions came about; how they passed into the hands of a voracious media; how suddenly elements in the media turned upon members of the Family; and how intercontinental media interests played off each other like modern brigands. The role of the modern media in manipulating public opinion - even in constitutional fundamentals - must be a source of grave concern to all serious observers. It is virtually impossible to get published in Australia serious opinions in defence of our constitutional system. This is in itself astonishing and disturbing.

But all that is as it may be. We must see recent events in their proper context. Only the Queen has any part in Australia's
constitutional arrangements. She enjoys good health. Her mother
still happily prospers. The Queen will probably be around for a very
long time - well into the next century. The crises of the last year
will inevitably fade in public memory. In considering republicanism,
Australians will see - in increasingly stark relief - the continuity
of the service of their Queen. And they will increasingly begin to
ask about the arguments which suggest that this stable constitutional
system should be preserved or overthrown.

In my estimation those arguments are of two kinds: arguments
from Realpolitik and arguments of principle.

ARGUMENTS FROM REALPOLITIK

Before we change our Constitution, it is essential that we make
very sure that the change is undoubtedly for the better. The
following considerations must therefore be kept in mind.

First, there is the very great practical difficulty of securing
constitutional change in Australia, given the provisions of s 128 of
the Australian Constitution. In the whole history of our Federation
there have been 63 proposals to change the Constitution. Only 12
have succeeded. We started well enough with the first referendum in
1906 which concerned Senate elections. Six States voted in favour of
the change. The popular vote in favour was nearly 83%. In 1910 two
proposals were put forward. Only one succeeded and that by a
whisker. By 1911 the course of our constitutional history was
becoming clearer. Two questions were put. Both were rejected, the
favourable vote being less than 40% and only one State favouring the
change. Thereafter the history of formal constitutional change in
Australia has been one of intense conservatism.

Unless there is concurrence between the major political
parties, it would seem that the people will reject proposals for
constitutional change. And even the existence of such concurrence is
certainly no guarantee of success. In 1977, the proposal of the Fraser Government for simultaneous elections had the strongest bipartisan support. Indeed it won 62.20% of the popular vote nationally. It even accompanied three proposals which were indeed accepted (casual vacancies; territorial representation; and retirement of Federal judges). But the electorate discriminated. The proposal carried in only three States. It was therefore rejected in accordance with the Constitution for no affirmative majority of the States was secured.

Not all of the rejections of constitutional change have been an exercise of unwisdom. I think it would now be generally accepted that the rejection of the Menzies Government's referendum in 1951 to dissolve the Australian Communist Party was an important protection of civil liberties in Australia. At the beginning of the campaign which was waged by Dr H V Evatt against that referendum, polls showed that 80% of the people favoured the proposal. But when it came to the vote, only three States could be gathered in. Only 49.44% of the popular vote was won. Sometimes s 128 of our Constitution has been a wonderful guardian of our freedoms.¹

Nor are we alone in constitutional caution. In Canada recently, a proposal, settled by the politicians, for constitutional changes to meet the demands of the people of Quebec was rejected by the people. The people of Canada affirmed the status quo. One commentator has observed that "the Canadians ended their constitutional odyssey by constituting themselves a people through an affirmation of the constitutional status quo".²

There is an added complication in the Australian case. The States of Australia are also constitutional monarchies. Their separate polities cannot be ignored. The notion that a future Federal Republic of Australia could dragoon a number of States which
preferred to remain constitutional monarchies is, as it seems to me, unthinkable. Containing continuing State constitutional monarchies within a Federal Republic might be theoretically conceivable but it would certainly be extremely odd. Effectively, this means that a republican form of government could not easily be adopted in Australia without unanimity within all parts of the Australian polity.

The last experiment in constitutional change should also not be forgotten by the proponents of a referendum about becoming a republic. It will be recalled that in 1988, for the Bicentenary of European Settlement in this country, we were told that we had to accept certain changes and to do so by our two hundredth birthday. The changes concerned Parliamentary terms, fair elections, the recognition of local government in our Constitution and the extension of the protection of certain rights and freedoms to the States. Again, at the opening of the campaign, the polls showed overwhelming support for the referendum proposals. But when it came to the vote, not a single one of the proposals passed. Indeed, not a single one gained a majority in a single State. One only gained a majority in one jurisdiction. The proposal for fair and democratic Parliamentary elections throughout Australia - so seemingly rational and just - was accepted in the Australian Capital Territory alone. Nowhere else. The dismal showing of the voting of the people of Australia reflected their great caution in altering our constitutional instrument. The average vote for the four proposals was approximately 33% in favour and 66% against. If this record of constitutional change does not have lessons for the republicans in Australia, nothing will teach them the realities of Australia's basic constitutional conservatism.

Secondly, as I hope I have already shown, the proposal for a
republic, at least at this stage, would not go by the nod. There would be many people who for reasons of principle or other priorities, would fight the referendum. Any referendum that promises more real or apparent power to any politician - even a single one as president - faces an especially rough passage. This can be shown clearly enough by the rejection of the proposals relating to the terms of Senators. These had bipartisan support of the political parties in 1977 and 1984. On each occasion a majority of the people was secured. But not a majority of the States. Every other proposal for constitutional change by referendum in the last 15 years has failed dismally.

In these circumstances, there would be many who would consider that our national energies should be devoted to priorities which would not be so divisive and which would seem to some to be rather more urgent. Priorities such as the reconciliation and proper provision for the Aboriginal people of Australia. The extension of an accessible legal system to our people. The improvement of the operations of Parliament. The provision of new initiatives to reduce unemployment amongst the young and not so young. The assurance of equal opportunity to Australian women and to other groups who suffer discrimination. The provision of proper educational opportunities and fair access to health care and services. The building of a truly multicultural society. The improvement of local government, roads, sewerage and other necessities of government. These are aspects of Australia's national life where things are undoubtedly wrong. They represent areas in which we stand a real chance of forging the national resolve that is necessary to secure positive action. And we need no constitutional changes to gain success in them. To inflict upon our country the wound of a divisive debate about a republican form of government - in a form not yet identified in its
particularity – would be grievously damaging to the spirit of the country: at least at this time.

Thirdly, it is important to emphasise that in every legal and real respect Australia is a completely independent country. Its independence of the legislative power of the Westminster Parliament began long ago. It passed through the Statute of Westminster in 1931. It was finally affirmed when the Queen of Australia personally assented to the Australia Act 1986 in Canberra. The United Kingdom Parliament now has no legislative authority whatsoever in respect of Australia. An attempt, even indirectly, to extend the United Kingdom's official secrets legislation to Australia in the celebrated Spycatcher litigation failed both in my Court\(^3\) and in the High Court of Australia.\(^4\) A similar result ensued in New Zealand.\(^5\) The legislative link – except to the extent that we have retained, by our own decision, great English constitutional and other statutes (such as Magna Carta) – is completely and finally severed.

So is the executive link as the events of 1975 demonstrated. Those events have had their counterparts in Fiji and Granada\(^6\) where the Queen, being absent, declined in any way to interfere in the independence of action of the local Governor-General. The idea of the United Kingdom or its Ministers advising the Queen of Australia in respect of Australian matters, or in any way interfering in the Executive Government of Australia, is now unthinkable.

The judicial link with the United Kingdom has also been totally and finally severed. Severing the mental links of some Australian lawyers to the laws pronounced in London is a rather more difficult task. But the High Court of Australia has made it plain\(^7\) that English law is not but one of many sources of comparative law assistance available to Australian courts. It has no special legal
authority whatsoever in this country. The common law throughout the world is a great treasure-house upon which we can draw in Australia's independent courts. But we are completely free of legislative, executive, judicial, administrative or any other formal links to the United Kingdom. Suggestions that we are in some way still tied to mother's apron strings are completely false. If such links exist, they reside in history and spirit. Legal links reside only in the minds of the wilfully ignorant or paranoid. It is therefore important to realise that republicans in Australia are not dealing with practical realities of constitutional independence. Their concern is only with a symbolic link in the person of the Queen. It is symbols, not realities, that they want to eradicate—at least that is the position of those of the minimalist persuasion.

Fourthly, republicans do not speak with a single voice. The standard proposal is for a minimalist change to the Australian Constitution—virtually substituting nothing more than a President for the Governor-General. But this does not satisfy the true republicans amongst us. For example, Associate Professor Andrew Fraser has described the Australian Republican Movement as the "Australian closet monarchist movement". According to Professor Fraser they are merely tinkering with names. Their system of government remains fundamentally that of a constitutional monarchy. Nothing much at all changes. For Professor Fraser and his supporters nothing less will do than to root out the notions and approaches of constitutional monarchy and replace them with a thorough-going change of the basic form and nature of our Constitution. This must start with securing a completely separate Constitutional Convention to bypass (or at least complement) the procedures provided under s 128 of the Constitution. So far, the vocal republicans appear, for the most part, to have rallied
around the minimalist approach. Perhaps that simply shows how abiding and congenial our system of constitutional symbols is. According to Professor Fraser it demonstrates the mind-lock of most Australian republicans into constitutional monarchy. The vocal republicans want a constitutional monarchy - with symbols above politics - but without a monarch. Is this all that we are to achieve at the price of dividing our country, diverting our national endeavour from achievable gains and hauling ourselves to the brink of a referendum on a political question where sharp divisions are very likely to result in the continuance of the status quo?

Fourthly, we should keep in mind that our present constitutional arrangement is remarkably inexpensive. It is true that the Queen and members of the Royal Family, when invited, make visits to Australia. That costs Australians something. But we do not pay for their upkeep at other times. We avoid the expensive trappings that typically surround a national Head of State today. Or at least we contain them within decent and very Australian bounds.

Fifthly, there is the personality of the present monarch. Although it is the system which is basically in issue, it is difficult to disentangle, in the proposed debate, the system from the current incumbent. Queen Elizabeth II is a person whose life symbolizes duty and service. These are symbolic values of great importance in fast-changing times. They constitute a special impediment to those who would change our system and who need a positive, even overwhelming constitutional affirmation to do so. They reinforce an instinctive view that the citizens of Australia, asked to reject this dutiful woman in preference to enhancing the powers of local politicians, will decline to do so.
THE ARGUMENTS OF PRINCIPLE

There are three arguments of principle for sticking - at least for the foreseeable future - with our present Constitution.

The first is the argument against nationalism. Much of the rhetoric of republicanism smacks of 19th century nationalism. This rhetoric is completely outdated and unsuitable and we should grow beyond it. Since Hiroshima, it behoves intelligent people to abhor nationalism and to seek after international harmony. Our present Head of state is an international one. The idea that we must have a local Head of State, always resident in our midst, is one which derives from an orthodoxy set firm before the age of telecommunications, the jumbo jet and a globalising economy.

Against narrow nationalism Australia's constitutional monarchy presents a tempering force. It is no coincidence that the most temperate of the states of the developed world, in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, are constitutional monarchies, just as it is no coincidence that more than half of the members of that club of democracy are constitutional monarchies.

Those who harbour a hope of closer relations with New Zealand must also keep in mind the utility of our sharing a constitutional monarch with that close neighbour in our region. It seems unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that New Zealand will change its basic constitutional arrangements. We should pause before severing such a special link with the country closest to us in history and identity.

The second argument of principle relates to the dangers of ill-judged constitutional change. There is a danger that an elected republican President would conceive that he or she had the separate legitimacy which came from such election or appointment. At the moment there is - and can be - no such legitimacy in the Queen's
representatives apart from the popular will. One of the reasons why the events of November 1975 shocked many Australians was precisely because of the perceived lack of popular legitimacy for the Governor-General's actions. It is this perception which puts a severe brake upon the use by the Governor-General of the prerogative powers. It is a brake I strongly favour. But there is little doubt that, without specific and detailed constitutional amendment, the prerogative powers of the Queen would pass to an elected or appointed President. That this is so has been demonstrated in Pakistan (including recently) and in other countries where a Governor-General has merely been replaced by a President.

In short, there is a risk that a local Head of State - especially one enjoying the legitimacy of a vote into office - would assert and exercise reserve powers which would be most unlikely to be used by an appointed Governor-General or State Governor. We have only to watch the spectacle of the contemporary conflict between President Yeltsin and the Congress of Peoples Deputies in Russia to understand the instability of a political system with two potential heads. Under our present system our Head of State can aspire to no such political rôle or power. Nor should - or do - her representatives. The same may not be true if we alter the incumbent and the method of determining the incumbency. This is as true of the State Governors as of the Governor-General.

The third reason of principle concerns the utility of our present constitutional compromise. What we have in Australia is a crowned republic. We have the historical symbols of a constitutional system of a thousand years without the trappings of the aristocracy and other features that would be inimical to Australian public life. At the same time we avoid the pretentions to which a home-grown republic could easily succumb: the fleet of
stretch limousines, motor cycle escorts, streets blocked off as they pass, a "First Lady" etc. In fact, we have developed in Australia to a mature system in which we are mercifully free of the pomposities that elsewhere accompany local Heads of State. To the complaint that we have no Head of State to travel overseas for us, I would say: we have our Head of Government. It is he or she who should ordinarily do the travelling. I can live quite peacefully with the sombre fact that our Head of Government attracts only a 19 gun salute. A mature democracy can easily miss those extra two guns, and a lot more arrogant pretention besides.

Like so many features of British constitutional history (the jury being the prime example) our constitutional arrangements function well, even though originating in a quite different purpose. They have evolved to a point where they are fairly well understood. The Queen and her representatives have extremely limited constitutional functions: to be consulted and to caution and warn. Because they are psychologically or even physically removed from political strife, or political dependence, their advice can sometimes be useful. Occasionally they can give the lead to the community where politicians are cautious. It is no accident that the elected President of the Republic of the United States of America (Mr Reagan) - the great communicator - could not bring his lips to mention AIDS in the first four years of his Presidency. During that time our Governor-General founded the AIDS Trust of Australia. Our Governors repeatedly supported AIDS benefits. They went to hospitals and hospices. They spoke amongst citizens about this matter of concern. And so in England did the Queen and members of the Royal Family. Occasionally it is important to have courageous but non-political leadership on matters of sensitivity which politicians - answerable to the ballot box - feel unable to give.
And then there is the element of ceremony and history. In my role as a Judge and as a University Chancellor I see the deep wellsprings of human need for the ceremonies that mark important occasions in life. This does not mean that we should sanction pomposity or resurrect the idea of a Bunyip aristocracy. I deplore that notion. Many may laugh at the investitures; at the openings of school fêtes; at the Vice-Regal presence in the country agricultural shows and for community groups. But these are places where our fellow citizens gather. Where they seem to feel a need for ceremony and personal recognition.

THE NEED FOR OPEN-MINDEDNESS

The only criterion for deciding upon Australia's constitutional arrangements is what best advantages Australia and its people. We must avoid rejecting something that is old simply because it is old and seems to some to be unfashionable. We must beware the changing winds of fashion - especially in constitutional fundamentals and particularly when whipped up by self-interested and one-sided media campaigns. We must be clear-sighted about the great difficulties of securing a change to our Constitution. We must be sensitive to the divisiveness and sharp differences that any such proposal would bring. In our multicultural society even the majority ethnicity has a place to be proud of its culture and history. As a mature people, we should be specially cautious about invocations of nationalism more apt to centuries past than to the century yet to come. We should not be too proud to stay - at least for the present - with a system of government which has served us well. We should measure carefully the advantages of our crowned republic - of our modest ideas about a Head of State. It is a mature country that basically gets by with a Head of State who is usually absent and which refuses to submit to the
calls of those who feel the need for a more constant, ever-present symbolic Leader. In the words of the poet laureate of a practical people: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it".

FOOTNOTES

* Based on an address delivered in Adelaide, South Australia, to the Australian Society of Labour Lawyers on 12 March 1993.

** AC CMG. Member of the Council of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy.


8. A Fraser, "What's in a Constitutional Name? Disarming the Australian Republican Movement" (1992) 1 Cross Examiner #2, 22; cf W Hudson, "An Australian federal republic?" (1992) 64 Aust Quarterly 229. See also ch 2 above.

10. See Special Reference No 1 of 1955 [1955] PLD 435 (FC) reported in W I Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan 1957 and noted Brookfield above n 6, 442. See also the case of Granada noted (1986) 35 Int and Comp LQ 950 and Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions [1986] LR Cth (Con) 35 (CA). In March and April 1993 a serious conflict broke out between the elected President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. This was not settled as this volume went to press. Nor for that matter was the struggle between President Mr Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federated Republic and the Speaker of the Russian Parliament, the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, Mr Rusfan Khasbulatov. The legitimacy of a voted President raises the spectre of the virtual inevitability of such conflicts.