

699A

AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

National Computer Law Adviser, Vol2 No2 , November 1987

IN MY OPINION

AUSTRALIA

Legal and Ethical Issues in Artificial Intelligence

BY THE HON. JUSTICE MICHAEL KIRBY, CMG

Artificial intelligence—A rapid advance Artificial intelligence ("AI") has at last hit us in Australia. A venturesome article in *The Age* of November 4, 1986, declared that Victoria was emerging "as a world center of artificial intelligence research."¹ If I were to question this bold assertion, my scepticism would doubtless be attributed to my northern origins. For all that, there is no doubt that artificial intelligence is on the march. We in Australia will not be immune from it. As with most technological developments, there will be great implications for society, for the law and for human rights.² These considerations are the focus of this article, which is necessarily brief and selective.

The first thing to get clear is how quickly expert systems are coming. The *Micro Electronics Monitor* for 1984 suggested that in the next two to five years the worldwide computer industry would produce a wave of AI products that would turn into a tidal wave by 1990. A forecast by the International Resource Development, Inc. of Norfolk, Connecticut in the United States, estimated that the United States market for AI products and services would grow from a mere \$66 million in 1983 to \$8.5 billion in 1993—and these are real, American dollars! The estimate suggested that the future AI market would be located primarily in the home, factories and offices. At the time of the report, about fifty expert systems had been built. Some were experimental. Others were in use in the companies which had built them. A few were for sale.³

The eventual goal of all of the research on AI is to develop computer systems which surpass human capabilities in reasoning, problem solving, sensory analysis and environmental manipulation. Some AI commentators do not expect this goal to be achieved within fifty years. Some even doubt that the development of a fully sensing artificial intelligence will ever be achieved. But the lesson of the past twenty years in the development of informatics has been that things happen more quickly than you expect; that things become smaller than you expect; and that today's miraculous products are, almost by tomorrow, obsolete. The difficulty for society is that, however quickly artificial intelligence progresses, human intelligence is locked into culture, linguistic and other prisons. The fundamental issue is the extent to which our human intelligence, and the human society it serves, will remain the master (and not become

the servant) of the remarkable developments of AI.⁴

The extent to which it will ever be possible to establish a reasoning and sensing artificial intelligence is controversial. In his 1984 Reith Lectures, Professor John Searle of the University of California, talking of "Minds, Brains and Science," declared that the present conception of a digital computer—a machine whose operations could be specified purely formally—eliminated the possibility that the machine could have thought with meaning. As Searle put it "the reason that no computer program can ever be a mind, is simply that a computer program is only syntactical and minds are more than syntactical. Minds are semantical in the sense that they have more than a formal structure. They have content."⁵

This suggestion of a basic limitation in the capacity of computers to think prompted the magazine *Nature* to comment that Searle's distinction between syntax and semantics was helpful only so far as it went. Unfortunately, declared *Nature* that was not very far.

"It creates but does not bridge a gap . . . The truth is that there already is a gap, but one that is already narrower than when the Lighthill report appeared 11 years ago. And the purpose of seeking to fill the gap is not to replace people by machines . . . but to understand better how people function and, perhaps, to improve the automation of processes as a byproduct."⁶

Other commentators have urged that Searle was wrong to dismiss the increasing complexity of the machine as irrelevant. Professor Ernest W. Kent, in 1980, demonstrated clear comparisons between microelectronic processes and neurophysiological processes of the brain.⁷ Dr. John Dawson, of the British Medical Association commented:

"While Kent, I believe, correctly shares Professor Searle's view that there is a one to one correspondence between the function of the brain and mental experience and that 'a machine built along the lines of our present computing machinery would be unlikely to have conscious experience on the basis of any similarity to the brain', he goes on to say that 'it is hard to conceive that the nature of mind is such that carbon, hydrogen and oxygen as opposed to silicon, copper and gold determine

its occurrence or non-occurrence. It seems more likely that some aspect of the brain's larger scale construction is essential, but which one? Complexity is a possibility. It may be that mind is a property of self sustaining, self organising data processing systems sufficiently complex to support it. This possibility is probably the one that most people who have considered the issue regard as the principal candidate."⁸

Dawson concludes that mankind will probably in due course build a machine which will achieve a recognisable consciousness. He quotes Kent's definition that consciousness in ourselves has at least two distinct dimensions:

"It comes and goes, we can have it or not, and we can have it in varying degrees from intense alert attention and concentration to drowsy relaxation verging on sleep. Additionally and independently of the level or degree of consciousness, our conscious activity has content. Our minds are filled with mental events of all sorts . . . given what is known about the relationship between reported states of conscious awareness and arousal and the physical measures of forebrain activities . . . it seems reasonable to identify the existence of the state of consciousness as a primitive mental experience with the operations of the reticulo-cortical circuitry and the state of maintained conscious activity with the physical activity around the feedback loop."⁹

But whether or not in our lifetime a machine will be developed with a recognisable consciousness, it is plain that the fifth generation of informatics will go a long way down that track. As Dawson points out, his BBC microcomputer beats him at chess every time. The capacity of "thinking machines" grows apace. It will continue to do so. The issue, is therefore, the social and ethical implications of this remarkable development.

Implications for peace and survival

In the nuclear age, it is obvious that the grandest and most important moral issue is that of the world's survival. In a week in which the United States Secretaries of State and Defense have acknowledged their ignorance of foreign policy initiatives being taken by the President, thoughts must begin to run to the human control which exists over the means of nuclear war. If people so high are (or say they are) ignorant of major and sensitive foreign policy developments, can we have certainty that "on our side," those who have control over the means of life and death have an appropriate, well informed line of command.

In the same week, the German Chancellor (Dr. Kohl) criticised as intolerable the leakage of

chemicals into the Rhine from a chemical factory in Basl, Switzerland. This instance, and the earlier nuclear leakage at Chernobyl, demonstrate the increasing interdependence of nations. In a scientific age, we are all interrelated. Transborder problems grow in number, complexity and danger.

One of the chief implications of artificial intelligence is obviously for defense systems. Indeed, there is a joke told by J.A. Campbell of the University of Exeter. He tells it thus:

"For the U.S.A., the joke says that the organisation which will have the biggest share of the funds at its disposal, move fastest and syphon off the best of what is obviously a limited stock of talents and experience in AI to work on its own choice of applications, is the Pentagon. Hence the American effort will be self handicapping as far as commercial competitiveness is concerned. The British section of the same joke says that the Government will tie up the relatively few equivalent AI specialists for several years on committees to decide how to handle the national funds when they may or may not be available . . ."¹⁰

It is clear that if expert systems take control of defense preparedness, they may put human life and health at risk on a very large scale if ever they go wrong. Yet they will not be subject to the same rules of control as for civil applications. The primary argument for introducing AI in defense systems is that there are some dangers, sequences of warning signals and so on which are just too fast for humans to be able to react quickly enough. However, as Campbell points out, there are some situations, even in military history, where doing nothing would have been a preferred solution to acting in a way which, on paper, was orthodox and appropriate but which led onto military disaster.

Judgment is the key here. The interposition of human sensitivity and evaluation is important. Yet how will this be possible if systems are automatically set off, on the excuse that the human mind would be just too slow to perceive the danger? At stake here is nothing less than the survival of mankind. There cannot be a more serious and important ethical question before us.

B. Shackel of Loughborough University explained his concern in a way that is relevant:

"[We] are asking machines to take responsibility for complex decisions and delicate judgments . . . But are we? I know of no instance where this is happening to a significant degree and I know of many cases where it could happen but does not. For example, the Victoria Line would be entirely automatic with no staff on trains themselves, but of course there is at least one driver to handle the unpredictable or unpredicted, such

as the variation in public human behavior. Again flight deck automation is now such that the pilot of a 747 at the start of the Heathrow runway could switch to automatic and touch nothing until the plane came to a halt at the end of the landing at Los Angeles, and in principle all the taxiing could be automatic also. However, the pilots will be there for quite a time yet, to handle the unpredictable or unpredicted, such as the American Airlines DC10 captain who successfully landed after the cargo door blew out (ten months before the disastrous crash outside Paris).¹¹

So the first ethical question is how we interpose similar skillful human judgment in the critical decisions of life and death which could affect the whole planet. Surrendering the entire future of civilisation to artificial intelligence in the field of "defense" is not, at least at this stage, morally acceptable.

Implications for the professions

In an essay on reforming the professions, I pointed out some years ago that the vulnerability of the professions was linked to what has hitherto been their special strengths: the fact that practitioners act as special repositories and disseminators of specialist knowledge. But if that knowledge can be integrated into automated systems an important issue arises for the future of the professions.

John Dawson of the British Medical Association considers it likely that the impact of expert systems on medical practice will not be to create more jobs for the orthodox professional. It will be to create more jobs for the computer specialist and systems engineer. Furthermore, he pointed out, it will raise questions about who accepts responsibility for the success or failure of a patient's treatment.¹² The probability seems to me to be that information systems will move from an adjunct to professional practice to the actual control of some professional activity. I will discuss the impact on my own profession later.

But computer aided design in engineering and architecture and computer monitoring of intensive care patients is already with us. According to Dawson, hospitals will be used increasingly only by patients requiring surgical procedures and intensive care. The areas of clinical practice in medicine that require manual skills (such as surgery endoscopy, anaesthetics and obstetrics) appear less at risk than others. Counselling skills, for example, in the care of the dying and mentally ill are likely to increase in importance as "scientific" medicine becomes more machine dominated.¹³

But as machines take over the control of monitoring and directing patient care, an important moral question will be the philosophy that is written into the software programs. What, for example, will be the philosophy written into the

monitoring of a grossly retarded or defective neonate? Dawson asks—only partly in jest—whether it will be possible to buy Catholic or Scottish Presbyterian software or software which reflects a Jewish philosophy or a humanist one? These are not really humorous questions. As we involve machines in the interface with human life, we are dealing with very delicate ethical questions and ones upon which human judgment, evaluation and ethical decision making have hitherto been considered vitally important.

One of the other ethical questions which Dawson raises is the loss of pluralism. While machine monitoring of prescription practices and standards of treatment may, in a macro sense, improve the care of patients, there is a danger that it will introduce a single standard. Many leaps in treatment of sensitive questions have depended upon the courageous individual who sees things differently. Will this be possible, or so easy, in a situation largely controlled by a software program with its element of predictable automaticity?

Implications for the law and the quality of mercy

In my own profession, there are doubtless many changes which will come with AI, and most for the better. They will include standardisation and equality of treatment and true access to accurate decision making because of the interposition of informatics. Some decisions lend themselves to automated treatment. Thus, for example, the qualifications for citizenship may be so treated—at least in the first instance. Under the British Nationality Act, the provision for British citizenship may be computed automatically thus:

"For every individual x date y individual z and section of the Act w.
X acquires British citizenship by Section 1.1a on date y—
If x is born in U.K. on date y and y is after the Act takes effect.
And x has a parent z
And z is a British citizen
By section w on date y."¹⁴

A similar approach could be taken to the Australian law on this and many other subjects. Many laws will doubtless be rewritten on this and many other subjects. Many laws will doubtless be rewritten in order to reduce the judgmental or discretionary element and to increase the element of automaticity. For example, I foresee the reduction of personal injury damages so that entitlements to compensation will be in the form of social security payments. These are more readily translated into automated form. No element of evaluation is required in determining simple issues of entitlement to weekly payments according to pre-injury salary and the number of dependents.

But is it desirable to sweep away evaluation in such matters? For example, how could any

program ever be so designed to compensate properly a person for cosmetic injury? Those injuries impact different people in different ways. I doubt that a program could ever be designed to take into account so many idiosyncratic and personal variables involved in such a loss, evaluated as open ended general damages.

Likewise, I doubt that a program could ever take into account the myriad unexpected events that occur in a courtroom. In an application for leave to appeal from a practice decision, the normal rule is that leave will not be granted unless there is a clear error in the exercise of discretion or some serious injustice shown which requires remedy. In the course of a recent application to the Court of Appeal a litigant in person broke down in our presence. His collapse was an important consideration for at least two of the Judges in demonstrating the exhaustion of the litigant and in helping to establish the need for an adjournment to secure legal representation.

I cannot conceive that such a factor could ever be written into an automated program. Human judgment requires a human face. It is responding to a complex of factual data. Some matters will be susceptible to automation. Others will not. It would be my hope that, at least in my lifetime, matters could generally come to a human decision maker to stamp onto the decisions which represent the exercise of power in society, the compassion and human understanding which only a human decision maker can offer, at least at this stage.

Other implications

There are many other moral questions which require consideration. One of them is the growing gap between the information rich and the information poor.¹⁵ There are a number of considerations that are exacerbating this gap. The opinion has been expressed that the fifth generation is likely further to increase the importance of information as a commodity and yet, ironically, will make it harder for the underdeveloped countries to "catch up" because they will continually fall behind for want of access to information.

Other issues involve the impact of AI on deskilling or job enrichment;¹⁶ its impact on organisational change;¹⁷ and its implications for a multitude of personal, ecological, economic and political questions. These are not abstract issues. As usual, the technology is developed more quickly than our institutions are developing to provide the responses.

Shackel has concluded in words which I find attractive:

"However good AI may become, intelligence is not the whole human. No human viewer has difficulty in recognising the high intelligence of Mr. Spock in the Star Trek TV series is not human; other human facts are missing.

Similarly AI takes no account of personality, emotion, motivation and other characteristics which join with intelligence to make the whole human being. But what if we eventually come to AP, AE and AI 2—automated personality, automated emotionality and automated illogicality? Might we then accept the resulting 'integrated artificial expert' as equivalent to the human partner?¹⁸

Hon. Justice Kirby is President of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, Sydney, Australia, 1984; Chairman, OECD Expert Group on Transborder Data Barriers and the Protection of Privacy, 1978-80; Governor, International Council for Computer Communication, 1984.

Footnotes

1. As claimed in *The Age*, November 4, 1986, at 30.
2. Kirby, *Human Rights—The Challenge of the New Technology*, 60 *Australian L. J.* 170 (1986).
3. *Micro Electronics Monitor*, April-Sept. 1984 (compiled by the Technology Program of UNIDO, Austria).
4. Mumford, *Expert Systems and Organisational Change*, in British Computer Society, Specialist Group on Expert Systems, Proceedings of a Seminar on Social Implications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems Oxford, May 10-12, 1985, at 41, 44 (mimeo) [hereinafter *Proceedings*].
5. Searle, *Minds, Brains and Science*, in BBC World Lectures 1984, Lecture Two "Can Computers Think?"
6. 312 *Nature*, Nov. 29, 1984.
7. E. Kent, *The Brains of Men and Machines* (1980).
8. Dawson, *Expert Systems in Medicine*, in *Proceedings*, at 18.
9. E. Kent, *supra* note 7.
10. Campbell, *Expert Systems and Professional Responsibility*, in *Proceedings*, at 23, 24.
11. Shackel, *Responsibility—Are We Asking Machines to Take Responsibility for Complex Decisions and Delicate Judgments? Is This Wise? Is this Inevitable?*, in *Proceedings*, at 27, 28.
12. Dawson, *supra* note 8, at 20.
13. *Id.*
14. Kowalaki & Sengot, *Computer Representation of the Law*, in *Proceedings*, at 4.
15. J. Thom, "Social Implications of the Fifth Generation," *Proc. ACS (Vic.)*, Feb. 1986 (mimeo).
16. Rosenbrock, *Deskilling or Job Enrichment*, in *Proceedings*, at 38.
17. Mumford, *supra* note 4.
18. Shackel, *supra* note 11, at 30.